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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated §78A-3-102 and §78A-4-103 which placed the matter before the Supreme 
Court of the State of Utah, and the Order dated May 13, 2009 which transferred the 
matter from the Utah Supreme Court to the Utah Court of Appeals for disposition 
pursuant to Rule 42(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure as of June 3, 2009. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES and STANDARD OF REVIEW 
ISSUE: Whether the Trial court appropriately granted CST's Motion for 
Summary Judgment when Strickly failed to controvert any of the facts presented in 
CS I - ilVIolioii IDIII S II I I I I in in, I in, Imli'.iiH nl i In pn >i*iil .up, n i i t n n v In i onliniln I lln 
evidence CST provided in its Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Standard of Review: Pursuant to I Jtah R ule of Civil Procedure 56(c), summary 
judgment is appro;):);! iate w hei e a i i io\ ant cai i ,4sho\ v 1:1 lat tl lei e is i 10 gei 11 lii le issue as tc 
any 1 i laterial fact," and that the movant is entitled to "judgment as a matter of law. bee 
also WebBank v. American Gen. Annuity Srw Corp . 2002 I T S8, \ 10, 54 P V 11 ^ 
l iuj iacts are reviewed n. oie light most favorable to the nonmoving party, u i . . 
reasoi lable ii iferei ices ai e i i lade ii I its fa\ oi Se "e •, h > h\ ts : -t t i • He 7 mes As socs., 21 )05 U l 82, 
]] 2, 128 P.3d 1151. Disputed tacts that are not determinative \\ ill noi preclude summary 
judgment . See Hogan ^ ndustrial Design Corp. ^ » U ^n 
ar .
 :
 • •• • • - " • - * . \ , - . i t ' i 
summary judgment for correctness, and \ i cws the facih and ali reasonable inferences 
drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Onis i> 
J ohnson 
Determinative 1 .aw: "Each fact set forth in the moving par ty 's memorandum is 
deemed admitted tor the purpose of summary judgment unless controverted by the 
on how to respond to a motion for summary iudument and while failure to strictly adhere 
to the technical requirements of Rule 7(c)(3)(h) max k harmless, an opposing 
memorandum must at least cleai 1) dispute facts ii I tl le n IC ti : n foi si in in i mi > j i ldgmei it 
\ i annlicable record references. Salt Lake County v. Metro W. Ready Mix, Inc., 
2004 UT 23,1123 n. 4, 89 P 3c 1 155. Bale 1 assertions, conclusory statements and * ' ' 
citations to legal authority are insufficient to overcome a motion for summary judgment. 
See e.g. Kitchen v. Cal Gas Co., Inc., 821 P.2d 458 (Utah App. 1991); See also State v. 
Garnblin, 2000 UT 44, T(6, 1 P.3d 1108. 
STATUTES AND RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
URCP Rule 7. Pleadings allowed; motions 
(c)(3) Content. 
(c)(3)(A) A memorandum supporting a motion for summary judgment shall 
contain a statement of material facts as to which the moving party contends no 
genuine issue exists. Each fact shall be separately stated and numbered and supported 
by citation to relevant materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials. Each fact 
set forth in the moving party's memorandum is deemed admitted for the purpose of 
summary judgment unless controverted by the responding party. 
(c)(3)(B) A memorandum opposing a motion for summary judgment shall contain 
a verbatim restatement of each of the moving party's facts that is controverted, and 
may contain a separate statement of additional facts in dispute. For each of the 
moving party's facts that is controverted, the opposing party shall provide an 
explanation of the grounds for any dispute, supported by citation to relevant materials, 
such as affidavits or discovery materials. For any additional facts set forth in the 
opposing memorandum, each fact shall be separately stated and numbered and 
supported by citation to supporting materials, such as affidavits or discovery 
materials. 
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(c) Motion and proceedings thereo: 
ii i accordance ' \ itl 1 Ri lie 7 I he ji ldgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers • •* interroizalories, and admissions on file, together with the 
aiiiddx ih. il uhv. <\iow liuij „Kii i^  no geiu.n.i issue .... 10 any rn.ateri.al 1 act ai id that the 
1 1 1 P \ I l i t ' M t f" ( > i i i * 11111'"" I I ' > i 1 1 1 ' I ' ' 1111" i i I | <\ , i 111 I M r i II in I" I in i \ < i mi 1 1 1 1 1 1 ; 11 i I n f mi | 1111 in in III, 
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on. the issue of liability alone although there 
is a genuine issue as to the amount oi damages . 
(e) Fo rm of affidavits; further t e s t imoin : defense required Support ing and opposing 
affidavits si lall be i i lade • .. ...: <• 
admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to 
testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof 
referred to in ai I affidav it shall be attacl led tl lereto oi sei v ed tl iere\ \ Itii "It he cc i ii It I I ia;\ 
pen: Yida v it: y "• oppose ' deposit ions, answers to 
interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported as p r o \ ided in tl lis i tile, an adverse party may not . -:.-:.. •?.. 
allegations oi dei lials of tl le pleadings bi it tl le respoi ise b> affidavits or as otherwise 
provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing thai there is a genuine issue for 
trial ^ u m m a n aidgmem - appropriate,, shall he entered aguUiSi a party failing to file 
s ' • • - * - ' • -
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70A-9a-406. Discharge of account debtor — Notification of assignment 
(1) Subject to Subsections (2) through (9), an account debtor on an account, 
chattel paper, or a payment intangible may discharge its obligation by paying the 
assignor until, but not after, the account debtor receives a notification, authenticated 
by the assignor or the assignee, that the amount due or to become due has been 
assigned and that payment is to be made to the assignee. After receipt of the 
notification, the account debtor may discharge its obligation by paying the assignee 
and may not discharge the obligation by paying the assignor. 
DIAGRAM OF THE CASE 
McCABE 
Lease Agreement 
(Work for payment from Strickly) 
McCabe Agreement 
(Assignment of right to payment) 
STRICKLY 
Strickly Agreement 
(Agreement to assignment) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
CST Financial Services ("CST") is a factoring company that advances money to 
individuals and businesses based upon their accounts receivable. Defendant Mike 
McCabe ("McCabe") is an individual owner-operator of a commercial truck. Defendant 
Strickly Truckin ("Strickly") is a truck and truck brokering company. In this case, 
McCabe and Strickly entered into a contractual lease agreement which provided that 
McCabe would lease his truck and personal services as operator to Strickly and in return 
Strickly would pay McCabe. McCabe performed the work required of him under the 
lease agreement and assigned his right to payment from Strickly to CST. In return, CST 
advanced eighty-five percent (85%) of what Strickly owed McCabe to McCabe, and then 
submitted McCabe's invoices to Strickly in place of McCabe for payment. Although 
Strickly agreed with CST to pay CST directly for McCabe's invoices, Strickly has 
refused to do so and has thus breached its contractual agreements with both CST and 
McCabe. 
CST filed for breach of contract by assignment in this matter on May 20, 2005. In 
response, Strickly mailed a 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss to CST dated June 8, 2005, but 
did not file the Motion with the Court until June 14, 2005. Strickly then proceeded to 
obtain a default judgment against CST on its 12(b)(6) Motion by prematurely filing its 
Notice to Submit on June 24, 2005, and then failing to correct its mistake despite 
assurances to CST that it would do so. Consequently, the default was subsequently set 
aside by the trial court at oral argument on November 14, 2005, and reflected in the 
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court's Minute Entry Ruling entered July 31, 2006. Strickly then proceeded to file its 
Answer, Cross Claim Counterclaim and Demand for Jury Trial on October 13, 2006, and 
CST filed its Answer to Counterclaim on October 30, 2006. On November 19, 2008 the 
Court entered an Order to Show Cause and on January 2, 2009, the Court held a hearing 
to determine why the case should not be dismissed due to inactivity. The Court 
determined at this hearing that the matter should not be dismissed and gave CST thirty 
(30) days in which to file the necessary paperwork. 
Consequently, on January 9, 2009, in an attempt to narrow the issues in the case, 
CST submitted its Motion for Summary Judgment. CST's Motion for Summary 
Judgment contained a "Statement of Uncontroverted Facts" that was approximately 36 
pages long and supported by approximately 350 pages of documentation and invoices 
which meticulously detailed each and every day McCabe worked for Strickly. On 
January 16, 2009, Strickly responded to CST's Motion by submitting its Opposition to 
Motion for Summary Judgment. Strickly's Opposition consisted mainly of a section 
entitled "Undisputed Facts" that was approximately 2 pages long and failed to refute any 
of the 36 pages of facts in CST's Motion for Summary Judgment, and further failed to 
provide any evidence that controverted the 350 pages of documentation and invoices that 
had been presented in CST's Motion for Summary Judgment other than bald assertions 
that the accounting was incorrect. URCP Rule 7(c)(3)(A) provides that "Each fact set 
forth in the moving party's memorandum is deemed admitted for the purpose of summary 
judgment unless controverted by the responding party". Consequently, Strickly's failure 
to controvert any of the facts outlined in CST's Motion for Summary Judgment 
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effectually served as an admission of all the facts contained in CST's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, and on April 15, 2009, the trial court was compelled to grant CST's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. On May 5, 2009, Strickly filed its Notice of Appeal. 
FACTS 
McCabe and Strickly entered into a contractual lease agreement (the "Lease 
Agreement") which provided that McCabe would lease his truck and personal services as 
operator of his truck to Strickly and in return Strickly would pay McCabe. [Rec. Index 
pgs. 50-51]. The Lease Agreement also provided that McCabe would be responsible to 
repay Strickly for expenses incurred by Strickly to maintain and repair McCabe's truck 
during the pendency of the Lease Agreement. Id. 
CST is a factoring company that advances money to individuals and businesses 
based upon their accounts receivable. In or around December, 2003, McCabe requested 
that CST provide him factoring services wherein CST would advance funds to McCabe 
for his accounts receivable. [Rec. Index pg. 170]. McCabe and CST entered into a 
factoring agreement ("McCabe Agreement") on January 7, 2004. [Rec. Index pg. 206]. 
Per the McCabe Agreement, in return for the funds advanced to him by CST, McCabe 
assigned his right to receive payment from Strickly to CST. Id. Soon after CST and 
McCabe entered into the McCabe agreement, CST faxed a corresponding agreement to 
Strickly ("Strickly Agreement") which explained that McCabe had assigned his right to 
payment from Strickly to CST, and provided that Strickly should send all future 
payments owed to McCabe directly to CST. [Rec. Index pg. 49]. Strickly approved the 
assignment and signed the Strickly Agreement with CST through its agent Tracy 
l l 
Strickland. Id. From January, 2004 though August, 2004 McCabe performed work for 
Strickly as required by the Lease Agreement, and was paid in advance by CST eighty-
five percent (85%) of his invoices. [Rec. Index pgs. 170-202]. CST then forwarded 
McCabe's invoices to Strickly for payment in full. [Rec. Index pgs. 170-519]. Each 
invoice forwarded by CST consisted of the total amount that McCabe (and therefore 
CST) was owed for the work McCabe had performed during the period covered by the 
invoice after any and all deductions made for funds advanced by Strickly on behalf of 
McCabe as well as for profit deductions as required by the Lease Agreement. Id. 
The total amount McCabe was owed by Strickly per his invoices after all 
deductions for funds advanced by and owed to Strickly pursuant to the Lease Agreement 
was $51,793.15. [Rec. Index pg. 201]. Accordingly, CST billed Strickly for the 
$51,793.15, but Strickly paid CST only $38,379.84. Id. Strickly claimed that McCabe 
owed more money to Strickly for advanced funds and produced records to that effect 
showing that McCabe still owed $7,718.01. [Rec. Index pg. 202]. Accordingly, CST 
deducted $7,718.01 from the $51,793.15 it was owed which yielded $44,075.14. Id. 
Consequently, since Strickly has only paid CST $38,379.84 and has been either unable or 
unwilling to produce any documentation or evidence to the contrary, Strickly still owes 
CST $5,695.30. [Rec. Index pgs. 202-03]. In pursuing legal action to recover this 
$5,695.31 from Strickly, CST has accrued legal fees of not less than $13,997.25 [Rec. 
Index pg. 555], and an expected additional $10,000.00 by being compelled to respond to 
this appeal which is without any merit and therefore frivolous. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Utah law favors the assignability of contract rights, unless the assignment would 
add to or materially alter the obligor's duty of risk. Lone Mountain Production Co, v. 
Natural Gas Pipeline Co, of America, 984 F.2d 1551, 1555 (10th Cir.1992) (citing Clark 
v. Shelton, 584 P.2d 875, 877 (Utah 1978)). And when an obligor receives proper notice 
of assignment, he must honor it. Cooper v. Holder, 21 Utah 2d 40, 440 P.2d 15, 16 (Utah 
1968). In this case McCabe's contractual right to receive payment from Strickly was 
freely assignable as it did not add to or materially alter Strickly's duty of risk, and there 
was nothing that legally prevented McCabe from doing so. McCabe assigned his right to 
payment from Strickly to CST. [Rec. Index pg. 170]. CST was an assignee for 
consideration as it advanced McCabe eighty-five percent (85%) of the amount owed on 
the invoices before forwarding the invoices to Strickly for payment in full. [Rec. Index 
pg. 202]. Strickly agreed with CST to make payment for the amounts it owed McCabe 
directly to CST, but has failed to pay CST in full and therefore has breached its 
contractual obligations to both CST and McCabe. [Rec. Index pg. 202]. 
In its Appellate Brief, page 30, Strickly admitted that if this were an action for 
failure or refusal to honor McCabe's assignment of right to payment from CST that the 
Trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of CST was proper: 
"Had this truly been an action by CST against Strickly for its failure 
or refusal to honor the assignment of the right to collect the accounts 
receivable due to McCabe from Strickly to CST, then the Court would have 
been spot on in its denial of Strickly's 12(b)(6) Motion and CST would 
have been completely correct in its denials of the need for it to provide 
13 
additional consideration to Strickly before Strickly had any obligation to 
CST." 
CST's Motion for Summary Judgment was precisely about the issue of Strickly's failure 
to honor the assignment of the right to collect the accounts receivable due CST from 
Strickly. CST stated the following in its Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment: 
"McCabe and CST entered into a factoring agreement on January 7, 
2004, under which McCabe assigned his accounts receivable and the right 
to receive payment from his debtors to CST in exchange for CST advancing 
the unreceived funds from his accounts receivable. Shortly after CST and 
McCabe entered into the factoring agreement, Strickly Truckin...signed an 
agreement with CST which provided that Strickly would send all payments 
owed to McCabe directly to CST...Strickly has not paid CST for the 
amount owed...Because of the non-payment by Strickly...CST is entitled 
to judgment against Strickly." [Rec. Index pgs. 125-26]. 
Whether or not there was any consideration between CST and Strickly is an 
irrelevant and misplaced argument as the requisite consideration existed between 
McCabe and Strickly, and McCabe made a valid assignment of his right to receive 
payment from Strickly to CST for consideration. [Rec. Index pg. 170]. The law of 
assignment does not require that there be any consideration between the assignee and the 
debtor so long as there is sufficient consideration to support the contract between the 
assignor and the debtor. See generally Lone Mountain Production, 984 F.2d 1551; Clark, 
584 P.2d 875. 
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Neither CST nor Strickly disputes the fact that there was consideration between 
McCabe and Strickly. Neither CST nor Strickly disputes that McCabe validly assigned 
his right to payment from Strickly to CST and that Strickly agreed to make payment 
directly to CST. Furthermore, CST has never disputed that its right to receive payment 
from Strickly is contingent upon the Lease Agreement between McCabe and Strickly. 
The crux of the matter is that while CST provided approximately 350 pages of invoices 
and documentation to the trial court to support its claim that Strickly still owed CST at 
least $5,695.30, Strickly failed to present any evidence whatsoever to the trial court to 
support its claims that McCabe still owes it money, that the evidence provided by CST is 
erroneous, or that Strickly has overpaid CST. [Rec. Index pgs. 590-91]. Strickly instead 
chose to make only meaningless bald assertions. Id. Therefore, because Strickly failed to 
abide by URCP Rule 7 and controvert any of the evidence provided in CST's Motion for 
Summary Judgment and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting CST's 
Motion, summary judgment in favor of CST was correct and proper and should be 
affirmed by this Court. See Orvis, 2008 UT 2,16, 177 P.3d 600; Bluffdale City v. Smith, 
2007 UT App 25, If 11, 156 P.3d 175; Johnson v. Dept. of Transportation, 2004 UT App 
284, ]| 7 n. 2,98P.3d773. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. The Order of Summary Judgment Issued by the Trial Court Should be 
Affirmed Because Strickly Failed to Controvert any of the Facts Presented 
in CST's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
URCP Rule 7(c)(3)(A) states that: "Each fact set forth in the moving party's 
memorandum is deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless 
controverted by the responding party." Rule 7(c)(3)(B) further provides: 
A memorandum in opposition to a motion for summary judgment 
shall contain a verbatim restatement of each of the moving party's 
facts that is controverted, and may contain a separate statement of 
additional facts in dispute. For each of the moving party's facts that 
is controverted, the opposing party shall provide an explanation of 
the grounds for any dispute, supported by citation to relevant 
materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials. For any 
additional facts set forth in the opposing memorandum, each fact 
shall be separately stated and numbered and supported by citation to 
supporting materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials. 
(2008). The Utah Supreme Court has recently held that while failure to strictly adhere to 
the technical requirements prescribed by Rule 7(c)(3)(B) may be harmless, a 
memorandum in opposition to a motion for summary judgment must at least clearly 
dispute facts in the motion for summary judgment with citation to applicable record 
references. Salt Lake County v. Metro W. Ready Mix, Inc., 2004 UT 23, |^23 n. 4, 89 P.3d 
155. 
CST filed its Motion for Summary Judgment on January 9, 2009 which contained 
a Statement of Uncontroverted Facts that was approximately thirty-six (36) pages long 
and was supported by approximately 350 pages of documentation and invoices which 
meticulously detailed each and every pay period of McCabe's employment with Strickly. 
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[Rec. Index pgs. 125-556]. The undisputed facts asserted by CST entitled CST to prevail 
on its Motion for Summary Judgment unless Strickly was able to produce evidence to the 
contrary. [Rec. Index pgs. 590-91]. On January 16, 2009, Strickly submitted its 
Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment which consisted mainly of a section 
entitled "Undisputed Facts" that was approximately 2 pages long and that failed to 
controvert any of the facts meticulously outlined in CST's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, but instead made only bald assertions and denials without reference to any 
supporting materials. [Rec. Index pgs. 557-62; 591]. Pursuant to URCP Rule 7(c)(3)(A), 
Strickly's failure to controvert any of the undisputed facts outlined in CST's Motion for 
Summary Judgment thus constituted an admission of all the facts contained in CST's 
Motion for Summary Judgment and the trial court was compelled to rule in favor of CST. 
[Rec. Index pg. 591]. 
In its April 15, 2009 Minute Entry the trial court stated that "[Strickly] failed to 
dispute the facts set forth in [CST's] thirty-eight pages of facts and forty-one exhibits..." 
and that "[Strickly] solely presents] [its] undisputed facts, without citation to supporting 
materials." Id, The trial court further cited the Utah Supreme Court in Anderson v. 
Taylor, 2006 UT 79, TJ25, 149 P.3d 352 wherein the Court explained: 
Our rules require "not just bald citation to authority but 
development of that authority and reasoned analysis based on that 
authority." State v. Thomas, 961 p.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998). As we 
have noted many times before, "[the] court is not a depository in 
which [a] party may dump the burden of argument and research." 
State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, [^6, 1 P.3d 1108 (quotations and 
citations omitted). 
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Therefore, because Strickly failed to show that even a single genuine issue of 
material fact existed, the trial court was compelled to rule in favor of CST, Id., and 
properly granted CST's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Strickly not only failed to comply with the technical requirements of URCP 7, but 
also failed to comply with the substance of the rule as outlined by the Utah Supreme 
Court in Salt Lake County v. Metro W. Ready Mix, Inc., 2004 UT 23, f 23 n. 4, 89 P.3d 
155. Strickly's Memorandum in Opposition did not contain a verbatim restatement of 
each of the facts that it disputed in CST's Motion for Summary Judgment with citation to 
relevant materials, not did the body of Strickly's Memorandum in Opposition clearly 
dispute facts in CST's Motion for Summary Judgment with citation to applicable record 
references. [Rec. Index pgs. 557-562; 590-91]. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in entering summary judgment in favor of CST, and this Court should affirm 
the trial court's ruling due to the fact that Strickly failed to comply with the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure and provide any evidence to the trial court that controverted the facts 
conclusively established in CST's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
II. The Order of Summary Judgment Issued by the Trial Court Should be 
Affirmed Because Strickly Failed to Marshal the Evidence in Support of 
the Trial Court's Ruling. 
In order to successfully challenge the sufficiency of the evidence with regard to 
the trial court's ruling of summary judgment, Strickly is required to marshal the evidence 
in support of the Court's ruling. See Martinez v. Media-Paymaster, 2007 UT 42, \ 17, 
164 P.3d 384. In other words, Strickly is required to present all of the evidence the trial 
court relied on and then demonstrate how the Court's conclusion is against the weight of 
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that evidence. When an appellant fails to meet the "heavy burden" of marshalling the 
evidence, the Appellate Court will generally presume "that the record supports the 
findings of the trial court." Moon v. Moon, 1999 UT App 12, \ 24, 973 P.2d 431 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
In this case the trial court specifically found in its Minute Entry granting CST's 
Motion for Summary Judgment that "[Strickly's] Memorandum in Opposition fails to 
comply with Rule 7(c)(3)(B)" and that "[Strickly] failed to dispute the facts set forth in 
[CST's] thirty-eight pages of facts and forty-one exhibits, including an agreement signed 
by Tracy Strickland acknowledging that all future payments will be payable and sent to 
CST Financial Services, LLC." [Rec. Index pgs. 589-91]. 
Strickly's Appellate Brief fails to identify any evidence or documentation that was 
before the trial court that shows Strickly's Memorandum in Opposition did in fact 
comply with Rule 7(c)(3)(B), or that its Memorandum in Opposition disputed any of the 
facts meticulously compiled and outlined in CST's Motion for Summary judgment. 
Strickly is instead now attempting to present issues and evidence for the first time on 
appeal that were never before the trial court. Consequently, Strickly has failed to marshal 
the evidence in support of the trial court's ruling, and therefore the trial court's ruling of 
Summary Judgment in favor of CST should be affirmed. 
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III. The Order of Summary Judgment Issued by the Trial Court Should be 
Affirmed Because Strickly did not Present any Evidence to Controvert the 
Facts Presented in CST's Motion for Summary Judgment and Strickly is 
now Attempting to Submit Evidence in This Appeal That was Never 
Before the Trial Court. 
As previously articulated, URCP Rules 7(c)(3)(A) and (B) provide that a party 
responding to a motion for summary judgment must controvert the facts alleged in the 
motion for summary judgment, and if the responding party fails to do so the facts alleged 
in the motion will be deemed admitted. Furthermore, Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 
24(a)(5)(A)-(B) provides that in order to raise an issue on appeal, an appellant must point 
to either a citation in the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial court, or 
provide an adequate statement of the grounds for seeking review of an issue not 
preserved in the trial court. "In order to preserve an issue for appeal, it must be raised in 
a timely fashion, must be specifically raised such that the issue is sufficiently raised to a 
level of consciousness before the trial court, and must be supported by evidence or 
relevant legal authority." State v. Richins, 2004 UT App 36, \ 8, 86 P.3d 759 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
As also previously articulated, Strickly failed to comply with URCP Rules 
7(c)(3)(A) and (B) and controvert any of the facts contained in CST's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. [Rec. Index pgs. 590-91]. Strickly was either unable to provide the 
necessary documentation or unwilling to take the time to collect even a scintilla of 
evidence to controvert the facts meticulously compiled and outlined in CST's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, and consequently the trial court was compelled to grant CST's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. Id. This present appeal by Strickly is nothing less than 
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a last-ditch effort to overcome its own failure to follow the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
as well as an attempt to circumvent and avoid the inevitable consequences of its actions. 
Rather than take the time necessary to competently and cooperatively review and respond 
to CST's Motion for Summary Judgment, Strickly instead submitted a cursory 
Memorandum in Opposition that contained a statement of "undisputed facts" that was 
approximately two pages in length and made only bald assertions without citation to any 
supporting materials, and which failed to controvert any of the meticulously outlined 
facts in CST's Motion for Summary Judgment. [Rec. Index pgs. 557-62; 591]. 
If Strickly had merely needed more time to collect the requisite evidence, there 
were other avenues it could have taken such as a motion for a continuance under URCP 
Rule 56(f). However, Strickly instead chose not to refute any of the undisputed facts in 
CST's Motion or to produce any documentation or evidence to show that CST had 
erroneously calculated the amount it claimed it was owed by Strickly under the McCabe 
and Strickly Agreements. Id, Due to Strickly's failure to provide the court with any 
evidence that contradicted the evidence provided by CST, the trial court was compelled 
to enter summary judgment in favor of CST. [Rec. Index pg. 591]. Strickly responded 
by filing this appeal. Such action should not be rewarded by this Court. 
CST submitted its Motion for Summary Judgment in an attempt to narrow the 
issues in this case. CST anticipated that by filing its Motion for Summary Judgment, 
Strickly would produce any evidence it had in its possession to contradict the facts 
contained in CST's Motion and thus the true issues of the case would become evident. 
Strickly had only to point to a flaw in the calculations contained in CST's Motion for 
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Summary Judgment and support its assertions with contrary documentation or evidence 
in order to create a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to defeat CST's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. However, Strickly failed to do so. [Rec. Index pg. 591]. Strickly's 
failure to produce any documentation or evidence that contradicted the facts presented in 
CST's Motion for Summary Judgment are evidence in and of itself that Strickly could not 
controvert CST's assertions, and that the amount CST claimed it was owed by Strickly 
was accurate. 
In its Brief of Appellant, AD pg. 6, Strickly has now produced a document which 
bears no sign of authenticity and which is the only document that Strickly has produced 
to date that could perhaps controvert the facts and evidence presented in CST's Motion 
for Summary Judgment. This document was never produced during proceedings in the 
trial court, nor at any time during discovery, and was not submitted with Strickly's 
Motion in Opposition to CST's Motion for Summary Judgment. Furthermore, this 
document contains unverified amounts for apparent trucking expenses that are 
unsubstantiated and could very well have been spontaneously concocted. However, 
regardless of the nature and authenticity of this document, since it was not produced for 
the trial court's review in considering CST's Motion for Summary Judgment, it is 
irrelevant now in this appeal. 
In its Brief, Strickly also raises issues of time and delay that are based on the Utah 
state constitution but fails to provide any record cites to indicate (1) that Strickly brought 
these issues to the trial court's attention, (2) that Strickly was concerned about the 
amount of time the litigation process was taking in the trial court, (3) that Strickly took 
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any action to accelerate the litigation, (4) that Strickly requested CST accelerate the 
litigation, or (5) that Strickly was in some way damaged or prejudiced by the delay. [See 
Brief of Appellant, pgs. 27-29] Strickly had the same opportunities as CST to accelerate 
the litigation in this case, and in the event Strickly believed it was being prejudiced by the 
amount of time being consumed by the litigation process, Strickly could have taken 
action. However, Strickly chose not to do so. Strickly was evidently content to allow the 
time to pass. Strickly had apparently made a strategic decision to allow the time to pass 
with the hope that this case would disappear or die due to inaction or decision on the part 
of CST not to pursue the case further. 
Thus even in the unlikely event Strickly has presented adequate independent 
grounds that afford it the ability to raise the issues of time and delay for the first time on 
appeal, Strickly's failure to bring these issues to the attention of the trial court and/or to 
independently take action to correct the delay and accelerate the litigation process at the 
trial level if it was suffering harm due to delay, are fatal to its attempt to now raise these 
issues on appeal. See generally Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(5)(A)-(B); State v. Richins, 2004 
UT App 36, If 8, 86 P.3d 759. 
IV. This Court should award CST its attorney fees pursuant to Rule 33 of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure as this appeal filed by Strickly is 
frivolous. 
Rule 33(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that "if the court 
determines that a motion made or appeal taken under these rules is either frivolous or for 
delay, it shall award just damages, which may include .. .reasonable attorney fees. Utah 
R. App. P. 33(a). An appeal is frivolous if it "is not grounded in fact, not warranted by 
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existing law, or not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing 
law." Id. R. 33(b). Furthermore, the Appellate Court may impose attorney fees as a 
sanction if it concludes that the appeal at issue is entirely frivolous. See, e.g. Porco v. 
Porco, 752 P.2d 365, 368-69 (Utah Ct.App. 1988). 
In a recent unpublished opinion ruling on an appeal that presented facts similar to 
the instant case, this Court awarded attorney fees pursuant to Rule 33 of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure. See Bennion v. Bennion, 2008 WL 4183012 (Utah App.). In that 
case this Court first observed that (1) the case as presented to the trial court involved 
routine issues extensively governed by statutory and case law, (2) the trial court had 
considerable discretion to resolve the issues presented, and (3) after the trial court had 
entered its rulings [appellant] opted to bring the appeal thus incurring additional expenses 
for both parties. Id. at *3. This Court then found that the appeal was frivolous and 
stated: 
"All of the arguments [appellant] advances on appeal are either 
unpreserved because [appellant] did not raise them before the trial court, 
inadequately briefed, or [are] based on facts entirely not in evidence. 
Further, [appellant] failed to properly marshal the evidence in support of 
his claims on appeal." Id. 
In the instant case, CST's Motion for Summary Judgment as presented to the trial 
court (1) involved the routine issue of summary judgment which is extensively governed 
by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, statutory law and case law, (2) the trial court had 
considerable discretion to resolve the issues presented by CST's Motion, and (3) after the 
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trial court entered its ruling Strickly opted to bring the appeal which has incurred 
additional and unnecessary expenses for both parties. 
Strickly's Brief first raises the issue of "constitutional right to have remedy 
without unnecessary delay". [Brief of Appellant, pg. 27]. Not only was this argument not 
preserved in the trial court, it is also without merit due to the fact that (1) the trial court 
timely ruled every time Strickly filed a Notice to Submit, (2) Strickly failed to take any 
action itself to accelerate the litigation, (3) Strickly never requested that CST accelerate 
the litigation, (4) Strickly has failed to demonstrate that it suffered any prejudice due the 
alleged delay, (5) Strickly has not presented any evidence to this court to substantiate its 
position and relies purely upon the bald assertion that "[Strickly was].. .severely 
prejudiced by the delay", [Brief of Appellant, pg. 28], and (6) Strickly has failed to 
provide the court with any law or fact that demonstrates that the trial court was required 
to do anything other than what it did. 
The second issue Strickly presents is "whether the trial court was correct in 
denying Strickly's 12(b)(6) motion without making any factual findings that supported 
the ruling." [Brief of Appellant, pg. 29]. In order for Strickly to prevail on its 12(b)(6) 
motion, Strickly was required to show that CST had "fail[ed] to state a claim upon which 
relief [could] be granted." Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). In making its ruling 
on Strickly's 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss, the trial court stated in its Minute Entry pg. 4 
that "a motion to dismiss concerns the sufficiency of the pleadings, not the underlying 
merits of a particular case." (quoting Tuttle v. Olds, 2007 UT App 10, \ 14, 155 P.3d 893 
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(citation omitted) (Emphasis added)). The trial court then quoted the United States 
District Court for the District of Utah and stated: 
"In considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), all well-
pleaded factual allegations, as distinguished from conclusory 
allegations, are accepted as true and viewed in the light most favorable 
to...the nonmoving party, [internal footnote omitted]. Plaintiff must 
provide "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 
face." [internal footnote omitted]...But the court "need not accept 
conclusory allegations without supporting factual averments." [internal 
footnote omitted]. "The court's function on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is 
not to weigh potential evidence that the parties might present at trial, but 
to assess whether the plaintiffs complaint alone is legally sufficient to 
state a claim for which relief may be granted." [internal footnote 
omitted]. 
TecServe v. Stonewar} Inc., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58929 (D. Utah Aug. 4, 2008) 
(Emphasis added)." Id. The trial court then specifically found that CST had sufficiently 
demonstrated its claim of breach of contract and therefore denied Strickly's 12(b)(6) 
Motion to Dismiss. [Rec. Index pgs. 592-94]. 
Due to the facts conclusively established by CST in its Memorandum in Support 
of its Motion for Summary Judgment and Strickly's failure to provide the court with any 
controverting facts, the trial court not only denied Strickly's 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss 
but was compelled to grant summary judgment in favor of CST. [Rec. Index pgs. 591, 
594]. In this appeal, Strickly has failed to marshal the evidence and demonstrate that the 
trial court was in error in relying upon the evidence provided by CST in entering its 
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ruling of summary judgment, and Strickly has further failed to point-out to this Court any 
evidence that it presented to the trial court which adequately controverted the 
documentary evidence provided to the trial court by CST that would demonstrate that the 
trial court abused its discretion by entering summary judgment in favor of CST. 
The third and final issue raised by Strickly is "whether the trial court was 
correct in granting CST a Summary Judgment.. .when it interpreted the [McCabe 
Agreement] to be a contract binding upon Strickly.. .without making any findings 
that...a separate agreement had been formed" between Strickly and CST. [Brief of 
Appellant pgs. 37-38]. This argument is misguided and misinterprets the law of 
contract. As has already been discussed, in general, contractual rights and obligations 
are freely assignable, and pursuant to U.C.A. § 70A-9a-406, once an account debtor 
receives notification that a debt has been assigned, the only way to discharge the debt 
is by paying the assignee. No separate agreement or consideration is necessary 
between the account debtor and the assignee. See generally Lone Mountain 
Production, 984 F.2d 1551; Clark, 584 P.2d 875. Once an assignor (McCabe) has 
performed as required on the underlying contract and assigned his right to payment 
from the account debtor (Strickly) to an assignee (CST), the assignee effectually 
"steps into the shoes" of the assignor and the account debtor may only discharge the 
debt by making payment to the assignee. See U.C.A. § 70A-9a-406. Furthermore, in 
this case Strickly as the account debtor expressly agreed to the assignment. [Rec. 
Index pg. 49]. Therefore, the argument advanced by Strickly that a second agreement 
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between CST and Strickly was necessary in order for Strickly to be obligated to pay 
CST is frivolous and without merit. 
In summation, all of the arguments Strickly advances in its appeal are either 
(1) without merit, or (2) unpreserved because Strickly (i) did not raise the arguments 
before the trial court, (ii) inadequately briefed, or (iii) the arguments are based on 
facts entirely not in evidence. Further, Strickly has failed to properly marshal the 
evidence in support of its claims on appeal. 
It should also be noted that in addition to the foregoing, Strickly has accused 
CST of lying to the trial court when CST noted that U.C.A. § 70A-9a-406 provides 
that "once an account debtor (Strickly in this case) receives proper notification that 
the account has been assigned, the only way to pay off that obligation is to pay the 
assignee (CST Financial). No consideration is needed to make a valid assignment" 
[Brief of Appellant, pg. 35]. With regard to this accusation, rules three and four of 
The Utah Standards of Professionalism and Civility state in pertinent part: 
"Lawyers shall not, without adequate factual basis, attribute to other 
counsel or the court improper motives, purpose or conduct...neither 
written submissions nor oral presentations should disparage the 
integrity, intelligence, morals, ethics, or personal behavior of an 
adversary...Lawyers shall never knowingly attribute to other counsel a 
position or claim that counsel has not taken or seek to create such an 
unjustified inference..." 
(2003). CST in no way "lie[d] to the trial court" as claimed by Strickly, and Strickly's 
accusation that CST had done so was improper. CST reaffirms its position that U.C.A. § 
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70A-9a-406 states that once an account debtor (Strickly in this case) receives proper 
notification that the account has been assigned, the only way to pay off that obligation is 
to pay the assignee (CST Financial). Furthermore, the statute does not require 
consideration for the assignment prior to an account debtor being required to pay the 
assignee in order to discharge the debt, and Utah case law indicates that no consideration 
is needed in order to make a valid assignment. See generally Lone Mountain Production, 
984 F.2d 1551; Clark, 584 P.2d 875. 
Therefore, for the foregoing reasons CST respectfully requests that this Court 
award CST its costs and attorney fees pursuant to Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure which it has incurred by being forced to respond to Strickly's frivolous appeal. 
REBUTTAL OF DEFENDANT/APPELLANT'S ARGUMENTS 
Defendant/Appellant raises the following arguments on appeal which although 
already discussed at length in this Brief, Plaintiff/Appellee will restate and then dispute in 
greater detail: 
Issue One: Did the trial court deny [Strickly's] constitutional right to have 
remedy without unnecessary delay by (1) failing to rule upon Strickly's Rule 12(b)(6) 
Motion to Dismiss for more than 1,270 days after it was filed with the Court; (2) by 
allowing the plaintiff CST more than 90 days after the court entered the default judgment 
against CST for CST to file its Memorandum in Support of Motion to Set Aside Default 
Certificate, although it never filed any Motion to Set Aside Default Certificate; (3) by 
allowing the plaintiff CST more than 100 days after the November, 2006 hearing to serve 
Strickly with the proposed findings and order to set aside the default judgment although 
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the plaintiff never filed the proposed findings and order with the court; (4) by allowing 
plaintiff CST 830 days, after the court set aside the default judgment against CST, to file 
its Memorandum of Points and Authorities Concerning Strickly's 12(b)(6) Motion to 
Dismiss with the Court. 
Response: The first argument is without merit. Strickly did file a 12(b)(6) 
Motion to Dismiss, and the trial court timely ruled on the Motion each time Strickly filed 
a Notice to Submit. Strickly filed its first Notice to Submit on June 24, 2005, and the 
trial court entered its ruling on the Motion in favor of Strickly on June 27, 2005. [See AD 
1, Trial Court Docket]. The 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss was subsequently set aside by 
the trial court at oral argument November 14, 2005, due to the fact that Strickly had 
improperly filed its Notice to Submit prematurely, Id., and is reflected by the trial court's 
Minute Entry Ruling on July 31, 2006. Strickly thereafter filed its Answer, Cross Claim 
Counterclaim and Demand for Jury Trial on October 13, 2006 and did not file another 
Notice to Submit on its 12(b)(6) Motion until approximately four years later on January 
20, 2009, at which time Strickly filed its Notice to Submit for Decision Defendant's 
Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim or in the Alternative for Change of Venue. 
Id. Although Strickly had permitted the litigation to continue for approximately four 
years without objection, Strickly then proceeded to insult the trial court by filing the same 
Notice to Submit two more times within the next seventy days. Id. 
There is no rule that establishes a fixed time period in which the court must rule 
when a party files a Notice to Submit. CST's Motion for Summary Judgment and 
accompanying memoranda and evidentiary documentation comprised more than 400 
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pages, therefore it was not unreasonable for the trial court to take 86 days to rule on 
Strickly's 12(b)(6) Motion. In its Minute Entry entered April 15, 2009, the trial court 
timely ruled on Strickly's Notice to Submit for Decision Defendant's Motion to Dismiss 
for Failure to State a Claim or in the Alternative for Change of Venue, and denied 
Strickly's Motion. [Record Index pg. 589-595]. 
Strickly's second argument in this paragraph should fail for several reasons. First, 
Strickly failed to object to the timeliness of CST's Memorandum in Support of Motion to 
Set Aside Default Certificate in the trial court although a hearing was held on the matter 
ten days after its submission, and therefore Strickly has not preserved this issue for 
appeal. Second, the entry of default judgment against CST was premature and an error 
committed by the trial court based upon Strickly's improper Notice to Submit, therefore 
the trial court had as long as was reasonably necessary to correct its error. See URCP 
Rule 60. Furthermore, counsel for CST conducted a telephone conference with counsel 
for Strickly concerning the premature submission of Strickly's 12(b)(6) Notice to Submit 
wherein counsel for Strickly assured counsel for CST that he would correct his error but 
then failed to do so. 
Third, Strickly has unclean hands. Strickly desires this Court to overlook its 
failure to comply with the explicit requirements of URCP Rule 7 in opposing CST's 
Motion for Summary Judgment while at the same time demanding that this Court strictly 
apply Utah Rules of Civil Procedure with regard to time in its favor. Such a selective 
application of the rules would be both inequitable and unjust, and would therefore not be 
in conformity with URCP Rules 1 and 8. 
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Furthermore, Strickly has failed to present this Court with any evidence that it was 
in any way damaged or prejudiced by CST's actions other than through the bald assertion 
that "[Strickly] depending upon receiving [a] ruling before proceeding with very 
expensive litigation on the merits [was] severely prejudiced by the delay." [Brief of 
Appellant, pg. 28]. This unsubstantiated assertion falls woefully short of demonstrating 
actual prejudice. And while it may be true that CST failed to formally file a document 
entitled "Motion to Set Aside Default Certificate", pleadings are to be "liberally 
construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action", 
[URCP Rule 1], and "[a]ll pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice", 
[URCP Rule 8]. Moreover, CST's Motion to Set Aside Default Certificate was mailed to 
counsel for Strickly who received and reviewed it without objection. Lastly, the 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to set Aside Default Certificate that was filed by 
CST articulated the requested relief and moved the court to take the requested action. 
[Rec. Index pg. 62]. 
Strickly's third argument in this paragraph should fail for the same reasons as 
Strickly's second argument. First, Strickly desires this Court to overlook its failure to 
comply with the requirements of URCP Rule 7 in opposing CST's Motion for Summary 
Judgment while at the same time demanding that this Court strictly apply the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure with regard to time in its favor. As has already been noted above, 
such selective application of the rules would be both inequitable and unjust and not in 
conformity with URCP Rules 1 and 8. 
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Second, Strickly has utterly failed to present any evidence that it was in any way 
damaged or prejudiced by CST's actions other than by making the bald assertion that 
"[Strickly] depending upon receiving [a] ruling before proceeding with very expensive 
litigation on the merits [was] severely prejudiced by the delay." [Brief of Appellant, pg. 
28]. No litigation was undertaken in this matter by Strickly other than to compile short 
and inadequate discovery responses and draft its six page Memorandum in Opposition to 
CST's Motion for Summary Judgment, therefore the bald and unsubstantiated assertion 
that it was "severely prejudiced by the delay" falls woefully short of demonstrating actual 
prejudice. 
Finally, Strickly's fourth argument contained in this paragraph is without merit 
because Strickly failed to take any action to accelerate the litigation process in the event 
it felt that it was being prejudiced by the passage of time. There was an abundance of 
remedies available to Strickly to move the case along had it felt that it was being 
damaged or prejudiced by the passage of time. However, Strickly failed to make use of 
these remedies or to raise the issue with the trial court. Evidently Strickly had made a 
strategic decision to retard the litigation, and was content to allow the time to pass. 
Moreover, Strickly never objected to the amount of time it took CST to serve Strickly 
with the Proposed Findings and Order, and consequently Strickly failed to preserve this 
issue in the trial court. 
Issue Two: Did the court make the correct decision by denying Strickly's 
12(b)(6) motion without making any findings that supported the ruling that CST had 
sufficiently stated its claims of Breach of Contract and Fraud, and where Strickly claimed 
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there was no valid allegation of the formation of a contract supported by consideration 
between CST and Strickly made in CST's complaint. Without a contract between CST 
and Strickly, there could be no fraud by Strickly. 
Response: CST's Motion for Summary Judgment was based solely on the issue 
of breach of contract by assignment, [Rec. Index pgs. 163-68], therefore fraud is a non-
issue. The trial court specifically stated in its Minute Entry granting CST's Motion for 
Summary Judgment that "Summary judgment can only be granted if the record shows 
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law", and that "doubts, uncertainties or inferences concerning 
issues of fact must be construed in a light most favorable to the party opposing summary 
judgment." [Rec. Index pgs. 589-90]. 
The trial court then proceeded to specifically find that Strickly's Memorandum in 
Opposition failed to comply with URCP Rule 7. The trial court stated: 
"[Strickly] failed to dispute the facts set forth in [CST's] thirty-
eight pages of facts and forty-one exhibits, including an agreement 
signed by Tracy Strickland 'acknowledging] that all future payments 
will be payable and sent to CST Financial Services, L L C [Strickly] 
solely presents] [its] undisputed facts without citation to supporting 
materials." Id. (internal citations omitted). 
The only issue for decision in CST's Motion for Summary Judgment was breach 
of contract by assignment, and the trial court specifically found that not only had CST 
sufficiently proven its claim to survive Strickly's 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss, but also 
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that due to the failure of Strickly to provide any controverting evidence, CST was entitled 
to summary judgment as a matter of law. [Rec. Index pg. 591]. 
The issue of consideration between CST and Strickly is misplaced by Strickly and 
is completely irrelevant in this case. It is undisputed that McCabe and Strickly entered 
into a valid contract supported by consideration and that McCabe then made a valid 
assignment of his right to receive payment on the contract to CST. [Brief of Appellant, 
pgs. 30-31]. When a valid assignment is made, the assignee effectually "steps into the 
shoes" of the assignor and therefore possesses all of the contractual rights of the assignee. 
See generally U.C.A. § 70A-9a-406; Lone Mountain Production, 984 F.2d 1551; Clark, 
584 P.2d 875. It is undisputed that if Strickly had failed to pay McCabe directly for work 
he performed pursuant to the contract, Strickly would have been liable for breach of 
contract. Likewise, since McCabe fully performed under the contract and CST has 
"stepped into the shoes" of McCabe, since Strickly has failed to pay the full amount owed 
to McCabe to CST, Strickly is liable to CST for breach of contract. 
According to U.C.A. § 70A-9a-406, once an account debtor receives notice of a 
valid assignment, he may only discharge his debt by making payment to the assignee. In 
this case, CST gave notice to Strickly that McCabe had assigned CST the right to receive 
payment under his contract with Strickly, and Strickly agreed with CST to make 
payments directly to CST. [Rec. Index pg. 49]. Strickly has failed to make payments as 
agreed and therefore has breached its contracts with both CST and McCabe. 
Strickly's arguments may be completely summed-up as follows: Strickly claims 
that McCabe still owes Strickly money under the Lease Agreement, and therefore 
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Strickly does not owe McCabe nor his assignee CST any money; that the McCabe and 
Strickly Agreements are subject to the Lease Agreement and that Strickly has overpaid 
CST for McCabe's invoices because McCabe still owes money to Strickly for expenses 
Strickly advanced on his behalf. [Brief of Appellant, pgs. 26-27]. 
This is a plausible argument, and CST has never disputed that the amount it is 
owed by Strickly is subject to the Lease Agreement between McCabe and Strickly. 
However, the crux of the matter is that while CST provided both the trial court and 
Strickly with a multiplicity of exhibits and documentation that conclusively proved the 
amount CST is owed by Strickly, Strickly did nothing more than generally deny that it 
owed any amount to CST and make bald assertions that CST instead owed it money. 
[Rec. Index pgs. 557-62]. Never once did Strickly specifically deny any of the 
documentary evidence provided by CST. [Id.; See also Rec. Index pgs. 569-78]. 
Therefore, based on all the evidence it had before it, the trial court was compelled to enter 
Summary Judgment in favor of CST. [Rec. Index pg. 591]. This appeal is now Strickly's 
attempt to do what it could have done in the trial court, and by so doing Strickly has 
caused CST to incur litigation expenses which could easily have been avoided. 
Furthermore, this appeal by Strickly is an attempt to circumvent the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure and avoid the inevitable consequences of its failure to abide by them. Such 
conduct should not be rewarded by this Court, and the trial court's entry of Summary 
Judgment in favor of CST should be upheld. 
Issue Three: Did the court correctly conclude that CST was entitled to a Summary 
Judgment against Strickly when it interpreted the CST/McCabe Factoring Agreement to 
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be a contract binding upon Strickly that required Strickly to pay CST amounts in excess 
of what it owed to McCabe under the preexisting lease agreement between Strickly and 
McCabe and when it entered summary judgment in favor of CST based upon a 
contractual obligation of Strickly to CST, without making any specific findings for the 
basis of the contractual obligation or the terms of the contract and where other than 
"implied consideration" no consideration between the parties was ever alleged by CST. 
Response: As has already been heavily discussed, McCabe validly assigned his 
contractual right to payment from Strickly to CST. [Rec. Index pg. 206]. Once that 
assignment had been made and Strickly had received notice and agreed to it, according to 
U.C.A. § 70A-9a-406, the only way Strickly could discharge its debt to McCabe was to 
pay CST. No consideration was necessary between CST and Strickly. See generally 
U.C.A. § 70A-9a-406; Lone Mountain Production, 984 F.2d 1551; Clark, 584 P.2d 875. 
The agreed upon performance had been executed by McCabe and McCabe assigned his 
right to payment from Strickly to CST for consideration. [Rec. Index pg. 170]. Strickly 
has failed to pay CST in accordance with its contractual obligations to both CST and 
McCabe. [Rec. Index pg. 202]. Strickly failed to produce any evidence for the trial court 
that controverted the amount CST conclusively proved it was owed in its Motion for 
Summary Judgment, and thus Strickly was found liable for breach of contract and the 
trial court properly entered summary judgment in favor of CST. [Rec. Index pg. 591]. 
This Court should affirm the ruling of the trial court. 
CONCLUSION 
Summary Judgment was properly granted by the trial court in favor of CST. 
Based upon all the evidence the court had before it, construing the evidence in the light 
most favorable to Strickly, and due to the fact that Strickly failed to Comply with URCP 
Rule 7 and present any evidence to controvert the undisputed facts meticulously outlined 
and compiled in CST's Motion for Summary Judgment other than by making bald 
assertions without citation to any supporting evidence or documentation, CST was 
entitled to Summary Judgment as a matter of law. 
In its Appellate Brief, page 30, Strickly admitted that if this were an action for 
failure or refusal to honor McCabe's assignment of right to payment from CST that the 
trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of CST was proper: 
"Had this truly been an action by CST against Strickly for its failure 
or refusal to honor the assignment of the right to collect the accounts 
receivable due to McCabe from Strickly to CST, then the Court would have 
been spot on in its denial of Strickly's 12(b)(6) Motion and CST would 
have been completely correct in its denials of the need for it to provide 
additional consideration to Strickly before Strickly had any obligation to 
CST." 
CST's Motion for Summary Judgment dealt precisely with Strickly's failure to honor the 
assignment of the right to collect the accounts receivable due to McCabe from Strickly to 
CST. Whether or not there was any consideration between CST and Strickly regarding 
McCabe's assignment of his right to payment from Strickly to CST is misplaced, and 
irrelevant with regard to Strickly's obligation to pay CST in accordance with McCabe's 
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invoices. Neither CST nor Strickly disputes the fact that there was consideration between 
McCabe and Strickly. McCabe then validly assigned his right to payment from Strickly 
to CST, and Strickly agreed to make payment directly to CST. CST has never disputed 
that its right to receive payment from Strickly was conditioned by the Lease Agreement 
between McCabe and Strickly, but Strickly presented no evidence to the trial court to 
contradict CST's evidence that in accordance with McCabe's invoices, Strickly still owes 
CST $5,695.30. Therefore CST respectfully requests that this Court affirm the trial 
court's entry of summary judgment in favor of CST. 
Pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 33, CST also respectfully requests 
that this Court award CST its costs and attorney fees that were incurred as of necessity by 
being forced to respond to Strickly's meritless and therefore frivolous appeal. 
Submitted this , $£ / day of October, 2009. 
Dusten L. Heugly 
Attorney for CST Financial ServicesTTXC 
Appellee 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on fo&fjy day of October, 2009,1 served a copy of the 
foregoing document, by U.S. Mail, to the following: 
Gary Buhler 
P.O. Box 229 
Grantsville, Utah 84029-0229 
Mike McCabe, pro-se 
1392 Martha Dunyon Cir. 
Draper, Utah 84020 
Assistant to D 
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
APPEALED: CASE #20090392 
CST FINANCIAL SERVICES LLC vs. MIKE MCCABE 
CASE NUMBER 050909240 Miscellaneous 
CURRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE 
L A DEVER 
PARTIES 
Plaintiff - CST FINANCIAL SERVICES LLC 
Represented by: DEE L HEUGLY 
Plaintiff - CST FINANCIAL SERVICES LLC 
Represented by: DUSTEN L HEUGLY 
Defendant - MIKE MCCABE 
Defendant - MIKE MCCABE TRUCKING 
Defendant - BILL STRICKLAND 
Represented by: GARY A BUHLER 
Defendant - STRICKLY TRUCKIN 
Represented by: GARY A BUHLER 
ACCOUNT SUMMARY 
TOTAL REVENUE Amount Due: 
Amount Paid: 
Credit: 
Balance: 
BAIL/CASH BONDS Posted: 
Forfeited: 
Refunded: 
Balance: 
646.75 
646.75 
0.00 
0.00 
300.00 
0.00 
0.00 
300.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COMPLAINT 10K-MORE 
Amount Due: 155.00 
Amount Paid: 155.00 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COUNTER 10K-MORE 
Amount Due: 105.00 
Amount Paid: 105.00 
Printed: 10/29/09 15:21:23 Page 1 
CASE NUMBER 050909240 Miscellaneous 
Amount Credit: 
Balance: 
0.00 
0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: CROSSCLAIM 10K-MORE 
Amount Due: 105.00 
Amount Paid: 105.00 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: JURY DEMAND - CIVIL 
Amount Due: 7 5.00 
Amount Paid: 75.00 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
Amount Due: 
Amount Paid: 
Amount Credit: 
Balance: 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: APPEAL 
Amount Due: 
Amount Paid: 
Amount Credit: 
Balance: 
1.75 
1.75 
0.00 
0.00 
205.00 
205.00 
0.00 
0.00 
BAIL/CASH BOND DETAIL - TYPE: CASH BOND: Appeals 
Posted By: GARY A BUHLER 
Posted: 300.00 
Forfeited: 0.00 
Refunded: 0.00 
Balance: 300.00 
CASE NOTE 
PROCEEDINGS 
05-20-05 Case filed 
05-20-05 Judge L A DEVER assigned. 
05-20-05 Filed: Complaint 10K-MORE 
05-20-05 Fee Account created Total Due: 155. 
05-20-05 COMPLAINT 10K-MORE Payment Received: 
Note: Code Description: COMPLAINT 10K-MORE, 
06-14-05 Filed: Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a 
Request for Hearing 
06-14-05 Filed: Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss for Failure 
to State a Claim or in the Alternative for Change of Venue 
00 
155.00 
Mail Payment; 
Claim and 
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06-17-05 Filed return: Summons on Return-Bill Strickland 
Party Served: Tracy Strickland (Wife) 
Service Type: Personal 
Service Date: March 27, 2005 
06-17-05 Filed return: Summons on Return-Miike McCabe 
Party Served: Mike McCabe 
Service Type: Personal 
Service Date: June 08, 2005 
06-24-05 Filed: Notice to Submit for Decision Order to Dismiss for 
Failure to State a Claim 
06-27-05 Filed order: Order to Dismiss (Bill Strickland and Strickly 
Trucking Inc. w/prejudice) 
Judge L A DEVER 
Signed June 26, 2005 
06-30-05 Filed: Response to Defendant Bill Strickland and Strickly 
Truckin's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim 
07-11-05 Filed: Clarification of Entry of Order 
10-03-05 Filed: Memorandum in Support of Motion to Set Aside Default 
Certificate 
10-03-05 Filed: Affidavit of Plf's Atty Dusten L. Heugly 
10-07-05 Filed: Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Set Aside Default 
Certificate 
10-17-05 Filed: Response to Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Set 
Aside Default Certificate 
10-25-05 Filed: Request for Hearing 
10-27-05 Notice - NOTICE for Case 050909240 ID 6434140 
ORAL ARGUMENTS/SET ASIDE is scheduled. 
Date: 11/14/2005 
Time: 03:00 p.m. 
Location: Third Floor - S35 
Third District Court 
450 South State 
SLC, UT 84114-1860 
Before Judge: L A DEVER 
10-27-05 ORAL ARGUMENTS/SET ASIDE scheduled on November 14, 2005 at 
03:00 PM in Third Floor - S35 with Judge DEVER. 
11-14-05 Minute Entry - Minutes for ORAL ARGUMENTS/SET ASIDE 
Judge: L A DEVER 
Clerk: rhondam 
PRESENT 
Defendant(s): MIKE MCCABE 
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): DUSTEN L HEUGLY 
Defendant's Attorney(s): GARY A BUHLER 
Audio 
Tape Number: Disk 056 Tape Count: 3:01-3:39 
HEARING 
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CASE NUMBER 050909240 Miscellaneous 
This case is before the Court for Oral Arguments re of Motion to 
Set Aside. Counsel argues the case. After review of arguments in 
this matter the Court grants plaintiff's Motion to Set Aside. 
Court grants attorney's fees to the defendants. 
Attorney's fees in the amount of $750.00 to be paid to defendant's 
counsel within 30 days or Motion to Set Aside will not be granted. 
03-08-06 Filed: Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Proposed 
Findings of Fact and Order Setting Aside Dismissal 
04-14-06 Filed: Notice to Submit for Decision 
04-14-06 Filed: Certificate of Service 
04-24-06 Minute Entry - MINUTE ENTRY 
Judge: L A DEVER 
Clerk: debbiep 
Based upon the review of the filing made since the Court's ruling 
on November 14, 2005, it is obvious that the parties cannot agree 
on the form of the Order. The court will, therefore, draft its own 
Order. 
04-24-06 Filed order: Order Setting Aside Dismissal 
Judge L A DEVER 
Signed April 24, 2006 
07-11-06 Filed: Affidavit of Kara Harris 
07-25-06 Filed: Request for Decision 
07-31-06 Minute Entry - MINUTE ENTRY RULING-MOTION TO SET ASIDE 
Judge: L A DEVER 
Clerk: debbiep 
On order of Judge Dever, Plaintiff's Motion to Set Aside Default 
is granted. 
Judge L A DEVER 
10-13-06 Filed: Answer, Cross Claim Counterclaim and Demand for Jury 
Trial 
10-13-06 Filed: Counter 10K-MORE 
10-13-06 Filed: Demand Civil Jury 
10-13-06 Fee Account created Total Due: 105.00 
10-13-06 Fee Account created Total Due: 105.00 
10-13-06 Fee Account created Total Due: 75.00 
10-13-06 COUNTER 10K-MORE Payment Received: 105.00 
Note: Code Description: COUNTER 10K-MORE, CROSSCLAIM 
10K-MORE, JURY DEMAND - CIVIL 
10-13-06 CROSSCLAIM 10K-MORE Payment Received: 105.00 
10-13-06 JURY DEMAND - CIVIL Payment Received: 75.00 
10-30-06 Filed: Answer to Counterclaim-Bill Strickland and Strickly 
Truckin's 
BILL STRICKLAND 
STRICKLY TRUCKIN 
Printed: 10/29/09 15:21:25 Page 4 
CASE NUMBER 050909240 Miscellaneous 
12-06-06 Filed: Answer of Mike McCabe, Mike McCabeTrucking 
MIKE MCCABE 
MIKE MCCABE TRUCKING 
12-06-06 Filed: Withdrawal of Counsel-Gregory B. Smith 
03-15-07 Filed: Notice to Appoint Counsel or Appear in Person 
03-26-07 Filed: Certificate of Service 
04-24-07 Filed: Certificate of Delivery of Answers to the Petitioner's 
Request for Admission 
05-18-07 Filed: Certificate of Delivery of Answers to the Petitioner's 
Interrogatories and Request for Production 
11-19-08 Order to Show Cause scheduled on January 02, 2009 at 09:00 AM 
in Third Floor - S35 with Judge DEVER. 
11-19-08 Notice - NOTICE for Case 050909240 ID 11731500 
Order to Show Cause. 
Date: 1/2/2009 
Time: 09:00 AM Location: Third Floor - S35 
L A DEVER 
The parties and/or counsel in this case are to appear before this 
Court and show cause why this case should not be dismissed. 
If you do not appear, the Court will enter an Order of Dismissal 
without further notice. 
01-02-09 Minute Entry - Minutes for Order to Show Cause 
Judge: L A DEVER 
Clerk: darlac 
PRESENT 
Defendant's Attorney(s): GARY A BUHLER 
Video 
Tape Number: 211 Tape Count: 9:00 
HEARING 
TAPE: 211 COUNT: 9:00 
This matter is before the Court of a Order to Show Cause Hearing. 
Plaintiff given 30 Days to file necessary paper work. 
01-09-09 Filed: Certificate of Service 
01-09-09 Filed: Motion for Summary Judgment 
Filed by: HEUGLY, DEE L 
01-09-09 Filed: Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment 
01-09-09 Filed: Affidavit of Kara Harris 
01-09-09 Filed: Affidavit in Support of Attorney's Fees 
01-20-09 Filed: Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment 
01-20-09 Filed: Affidavit of Tracy Strickland 
01-20-09 Filed: Notice to Submit for Decision Defendant's Mottion to 
Dismiss for Failure to State a claim or in the Alternative for 
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Change of Venue. 
01-21-09 Note: **Binder with Plf's Motion for Summary Judgment Pleadings 
and Documents are in the top file cabinet** 
02-17-09 Filed: Response to Defts1 Memorandum in Opposition to Motion 
for Summary Judgment 
02-17-09 Filed: Notice to Submit for Decision 
02-20-09 Filed: Second Notice to Submit for Decision Defendants Motion 
to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim or in the Alternative 
for Change of Venue 
02-23-09 Filed: Memorandum of Points and Authorities Concerning Strickly 
Truckinfs Motion to Dismiss or Alternative Change of Venue 
03-31-09 Filed: Third Notice to Submit for Decision Deftfs Motion to 
Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim or in the Alternative for 
Change of Venue 
04-15-09 Filed order: MINUTE ENTRY (See Written Decision) 
Judge L A DEVER 
Signed April 14, 2009 
04-21-09 Fee Account created Total Due: 1.75 
04-21-09 COPY FEE Payment Received: 1.75 
05-05-09 Filed: Notice of Appeal 
05-05-09 Filed: Notice of Appeal 
05-05-09 Fee Account created Total Due: 205.00 
05-05-09 APPEAL Payment Received: 205.00 
Note: Code Description: APPEAL 
05-05-09 Bond Account created Total Due: 300.00 
05-05-09 Bond Posted Payment Received: 300.00 
05-06-09 Note: Cert/copy of Notice of Appeal sent to Court of Appeals. 
05-14-09 Filed: Supreme Court of Utah-Letter to Mr Buhler-Notice of 
Appeal has been filed-Case # 20090392-SC should be reflected on 
any future filings 
05-14-09 Filed: Supreme Court of Utah-Order-Effective twenty days from 
May 13, 2009 this matter will transfer to Utah Court of Appeals 
05-14-09 Note: Appealed: Case #20090392 
06-05-09 Filed: Letter from Court of Appeals to Mr. Buhler stating the 
appeal has been filed. 20090392 CA 
06-30-09 Filed: Transcript, original, of Oral Arguments on 11/14/05, 
prepared by Beverly Lowe, CSR/CCT. 
07-07-09 Note: Record Forwarded **AS IS** to Merilyn @ Utah Court of 
Appeals -Files 2 Transcripts 1 
07-10-09 Filed: Utah Court of Appeals Letter to 3rd District Appellate 
Clerk- Request for Pagination and Index-20090392-CA 
07-29-09 Note: RECORD INDEXED 
07-29-09 Note: CERT/COPY OF RECORD INDEX FORWARDED TO UTAH COURT OF 
APPEALS 
08-25-09 Filed: Ex Parte Motion for Hearing to Identify Judgment 
Debtor's Property 
08-26-09 Filed order: Order Scheduling Hearing to Identify Judgment 
Debtor's Property 
Judge L A DEVER 
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Signed August 25, 2009 
09-15-09 IDENTIFY JUDGMENT DEBTOR scheduled on October 23, 2009 at 09:15 
AM in Third Floor - S35 with Judge DEVER. 
10-21-09 Note: **Per phone call from Atty's Office, they werr not able 
to serve the Deft, Hearing to be stricken from the calendar** 
10-21-09 IDENTIFY JUDGMENT DEBTOR Cancelled. 
Reason: Counsel's request. 
10-28-09 Note: Record returned Files 2 transcripts 1 
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